Private linear key agreement (PLKA) enables a group of users to agree upon a common session key in a broadcast encryption (BE) scenario, while traitor tracing (TT) system allows a tracer to identify conspiracy of a troop of colluding pirate users. This paper introduces a key encapsulation mechanism in BE that provides the functionalities of both PLKA and TT in a unified cost-effective primitive. Our PLKA based traitor tracing offers a solution to the problem of achieving full collusion resistance property and public traceability simultaneously with significant efficiency and storage compared to a sequential improvement of the PLKA based traitor tracing systems. Our PLKA builds on a prime order multilinear group setting employing indistinguishability obfuscation (iO) and pseudorandom function (PRF). The resulting scheme has a fair communication, storage and computational efficiency compared to that of composite order groups. Our PLKA is adaptively chosen ciphertext attack (CCA)-secure and based on the hardness of the multilinear assumption, namely, the Decisional Hybrid Diffie-Hellman Exponent (DHDHE) assumption in standard model and so far a plausible improvement in the literature. More precisely, our PLKA design significantly reduces the ciphertext size, public parameter size and user secret key size. We frame a traitor tracing algorithm with shorter running time which can be executed publicly.
INTRODUCTION
A private linear key agreement (PLKA) under key encapsulation framework requires the broadcaster to broadcast a common message, called header, for a specific type of user sets [i] ∈ S where S = {[1], . . . , [N]} ⊂ 2 [N] and [i] = {1, . . . , i} is the collection of users. Each user is assigned a private key by a group manager (GM). The GM is a trusted third party and the role of a broadcaster may be played by the GM or by a seperate entity depending on applications. The header along with the user's pre-assigned private key enables users in [i] to extract a session key common to all the users in [i] . On the other hand, a PLKA based broadcast encryption (BE) empowers a content broadcaster to broadcast an encrypted message under a common session key for [i] ∈ S so that a user u ∈ [i] can decrypt the ciphertext using his private key. The users outside [i] obtain nothing even if they collude for both the key encapsulation model and broadcast model of PLKA. The first construction for PLKA was designed by followed by a number of works (Garg et al., 2010; Nishimaki et al., 2016) . Consider a traditional cable TV system where the broadcaster broadcasts a classified digital content encrypted under a publicly known key to a set of legitimate users. Each legitimate user, having a valid private key embedded within a set-top box provided by the GM, can successfully decrypt and recover the classified content. Any user, who has paid to get his private key from the GM, might make a reprint to resell his private key or even publish it on the Internet. This allows unauthorized users to decrypt the classified content without having a legal authorization, causing the broadcaster a massive financial loss. Consequently, the broadcaster will attempt to identify those rouge user. A Traitor tracing (TT) system is devised to aid content broadcasters to identify conspiracy of defrauders who create a pirate decoder box. A coalition of traitors might make a conspiracy to create the pirate decoder containing an arbitrarily complex and even obfuscated malicious program and is capable of decrypting the encrypted digital content. The traitors composite,
, DHSD, BSD composite, BL 4
, DHSD, BSD (Garg et al., 2010) prime, ) − poly(log N, η) η poly(log N, η) public iO & FE security (Nishimaki et al., 2016 )−I − poly(η) poly(n) poly(n, |m|) public iO & FE security (Nishimaki et al., 2016 )−II − poly(log n) poly(n) |m| + poly(log n) public iO security (Garg et al., 2016) composite, ML poly(log N) poly(log N) poly(log N) public FE security Ours prime, ML poly(log N, η) 1 in G ρ 2 in G ρ , 3η, log (N) public DHDHE and iO security |PP| = public parameter size, |sk u | = user secret key size, |CT| = ciphertext size, BL = bilinear, ML = multilinear, FE = functional encryption, D3DH = Decision (modified) 3-party Diffie-Hellman, DHSD = Diffie-Hellman Subgroup Decision, BSD = Bilinear Subgroup Decision, XDH = External Diffie-Hellman, DHDHE = Decisional Hybrid Diffie-Hellman Exponent assumptions, G = Bilinear source group, G T = Bilinear target group, G ρ = Multilinear intermediate group, n = arbitrary bit-length of user identity, |m| = message-bit length, N = total number of users in the system and, η = security parameter.
might alter their private keys in such a way that the altered keys cannot be linked with their original private keys. A traitor tracing system runs an efficient tracing algorithm that interacts with the pirate decoder considering it as a black-box oracle and outputs at least one identity of the traitors in the coalition who was involved to create the malicious program using his own private key. Pirate cable TV, set-top decoders, encrypted satellite radio, pirate decryption software posted on the Internet etc. are few examples of pirate decoder box. A naive approach to address this problem is the following. For a system having N users, the broadcaster broadcasts N ciphertext under N different public keys whereby a legitimate user can decrypt the ciphertext corresponding to his own secret key. Consequently, given any pirate decoder, it is easy to pinpoint at least one traitor whose secret key is used to fabricate the pirate decoder. However, this solution is inefficient as the ciphertext size is linear in N. Although a PLKA system has the capability of fraud detection, it is not always possible to switch a general BE scheme into a tracing scheme. Designing a PLKA traitor tracing, with shorter size ciphertext, public parameter and the user secret key is a challenging task. Related work. Traitor tracing was formally introduced by (Chor et al., 1994) , followed by a several works in different flavors (Kiayias and Yung, 2001; Garg et al., 2010; Nishimaki et al., 2016; Garg et al., 2016) . In 2001, (Kiayias and Yung, 2001) proposed tcollusion resistant tracing mechanism with ciphertext size linear in t. A collusion of at most t-users are allowed to construct a pirate decoder in such system. The first fully collusion resistant PLKA with traitor tracing was proposed by in composite order bilinear group with sublinear size parameters. Later, (Garg et al., 2010 ) developed a similar variant on prime order bilinar group setting. Depending on the tracing authority, traitor tracing systems fall into two categories − (a) publicly traceable that does not require any secret inputs except the public parameter in the tracing algorithm Garg et al., 2010; Nishimaki et al., 2016; Garg et al., 2016) , and (b) secretly traceable which uses a secret tracing key to identify rogue users Kiayias and Yung, 2001) . In 2014, ) constructed a fully collusion resistant PLKA traitor tracing with public traceability utilizing the constrained pseudorandom functions (cPRFs) and indistinguishability obfuscation (iO). All the aforementioned PLKA schemes use the Hybrid Coloring tracing approach of (Kiayias and Yung, 2001) . Adopting iO, (Nishimaki et al., 2016) exhibited that a PLKA traitor tracing is an immediate consequence of functional encryption (FE). In (Garg et al., 2016) , a FE scheme is designed in composite order asymmetric multilinear group setting without iO and provides another indirect construction of traitor tracing. As pointed out by (Garg et al., 2010) , the communication, storage, and computational efficiency of prime order groups are much higher compared to that of composite order group. None of the schemes (Nishimaki et al., 2016; Garg et al., 2016) provide explicit construction of PLKA traitor tracing. Our main focus in this work is to build a PLKA traitor tracing scheme over prime order multilinear groups (Coron et al., 2015; Gentry et al., 2015) achieving order-of-magnitude improvements in efficiency and storage without any security breach.
Our contribution. We design a PLKA construction coupling pseudorandom function (PRF) of (Goldreich et al., 1986) with indistinguishability obfuscation (iO), and adopting multilinear maps over prime order group. Note that several recent attacks have broken many assumptions on known multilinear maps 3
N = total number of users in the system, η = security parameter. (Coron et al., 2015; Gentry et al., 2015) . Recently, (Gu, 2015) constructed a new variant of the multilinear maps which seemed to thwart known attacks. We skillfully integrate the tracing mechanism of (Kiayias and Yung, 2001) in our PLKA, yielding the first fully collusion resistant and publicly traceable PLKA traitor tracing in key encapsulation framework over prime order multilinear group setting with tracing algorithm having shorter running time. We summarize below our main findings in this work:
• Our PLKA construction significantly reduces the parameter sizes as exhibited by Table 1 . The public parameter size in our construction is polylogarithmic in N while the ciphertext size is logarithmic in N. Here, N is the total number of users in the system. More interestingly, user secret key is a single multilinear group element in our PLKA.
• We emphasize that our scheme is adaptively chosen ciphertext attack (CCA)-secure under the Decisional Hybrid Diffie-Hellman Exponent (DHDHE)-assumption in standard security model and relies on iO security. Note that recently iO is aggregately constructible from the puncturable secret key functional encryption (Kitagawa et al., 2018) . Our tracing algorithm enables to trace the conspiracy of an arbitrary number of defrauders using the public parameter only. On a more positive note, we have shown that although we follow the tracing approach of (Kiayias and Yung, 2001) , the run time of our tracing algorithm is poly((log N) 2 , η), where η is the security parameter. Running time of tracing algorithms is O(N 3 ) for all the existing PLKA traitor tracing schemes based on Hybrid Coloring tracing mechanism of (Kiayias and Yung, 2001 ). In sum, we achieve a publicly traceable and fully collusion resistant traitor tracing scheme with shorter running time.
• The PLKA design of Garg et al., 2010) uses bilinear maps while that of is constructed using the security of iO and cPRFs (Boneh and Waters, 2013) . The work of (Nishimaki et al., 2016; Garg et al., 2016) are based on FE. Coupling iO with the one way function, (Nishimaki et al., 2016) constructed a FE scheme and furnished an idea to transform it into a traitor tracing scheme. They set up with the exponentially large identity space and embedded user's arbitrary information in their secret key. As a result, the user identily bit-length become arbitrarily large. As shown in Table 1 , the size of ciphertext and the user secret key in their works grow with the identity bit-length which is arbitrarily large, and also the ciphertext size depends on the message-bit length. The size of the parameters in our PLKA construction are independent of identity bit-length as well as the messagebit length. Our PLKA has similar parameter sizes as that of the PLKA of which stance upon four cPRFs in generic forms showing only the input-output behaviour. Additionally, the work of utilizes the multilinear map based cPRF of (Boneh and Waters, 2013) which are themselves based on multilinear maps that requires at least O(log N) symmetric multilinear pairing operations which are known to be very expensive. In contrast, we use only two PRFs of (Goldreich et al., 1986) which are efficient due to their inherent tree structures.
• Table 2 shows the computation comparison in terms of number of pairings, exponentiations, multiplications and run time of the tracing algorithm. We exclude (Garg et al., 2016; Nishimaki et al., 2016; from Table 2 as suitable FE schemes and multiparty key exchange protocols are the primary requirements in these works rather than direct constructions for traitor tracing. To trace all the traitors, (Nishimaki et al., 2016) proposed an oracle jump finding (OJF) problem and showed that any PLKA is sufficient for traitor tracing employing OJF problem. However, to run the tracing algorithm, the works of (Nishimaki et al., 2016) requires the total number q of traitors belonging to the pirate decoder D as an extra input and run time of OJF algorithm is poly(log N, q, η) which is faster than our PLKA construction. For the bounded collusion resistant schemes, q is publicly known. In many real life scenarios, the tracing algorithm is given black-box interactions with D and finding q at prior not always possible. Unlike this, our tracing algorithm does not require any prior knowledge of parameters like q and runs in poly((log N) 2 , η) time using only the public parameter as the inputs.
. . , j} be the set of all positive integers from 1 to j. Given any set S, x ∈ R S stands for x drawn uniformly at random from S. For a randomized algorithm RandA, y ← RandA(z) represents output by RandA on input z. A probabilistic polynomial time algorithm is denoted by PPT and η is the security parameter.
Definition 1. (Negligible Function) A function Ψ : N → R is said to be negligible in N, if for every positive integer c there exists an integer N c such that
where X i independent random variables for i = 1, . . . , n. Let X i = 1 with probability p i , X i = 0 with
n , where a = µδ is an arbitrary constant and 0 < δ < 1.
Definition 3. (Pseudorandom Function(PRF))
A PRF (Blum and Micali, 1984 ) is a function denoted
that can be computed by a deterministic polynomial time algorithm which on input a fixed but randomly chosen key k
indistinguishable from a random function.
Definition 4. (Indistinguishability Obfuscator)
A uniform probabilistic polynomial time machine iO for a circuit class {C η }, with circuits of size at most η, is called an indistinguishability obfuscator (iO) (Kitagawa et al., 2018) if it amuses the following properties.
• Functionality Preserving: For all security parameters η ∈ N, for all circuit C ∈ {C η } and for all inputs x, iO(η,C) preserves the functionality of the circuit C under the obfuscation, i.e., Pr[∀x,
• Indistinguishability: For all pairs of probabilis-
In other words, if two circuits C 0 ,C 1 ∈ {C η } have the same functionality, then the obfuscated circuits iO(η,C 0 ) and iO(η,C 1 ) are also indistinguishable, where the probability is taken over the random coins of D 2 and the obfuscator iO.
Note that if no confusion arises, we will omit η as an input to iO and as a subscript for C .
Asymmetric Multilinear Map and Complexity Assumption
) of (Coron et al., 2015; Gentry et al., 2015) consists of the following two algorithms.
• (aPPM)← aM M .Setup(1 η , ρ): It takes as input the security parameter 1 η and sets up ρ-leveled linear map, where ρ is some positive vector of length κ + 1. It outputs a description of all possible groups G ϑ for all the vectors ϑ ∈ (N ∪ {0}) κ+1 with the restriction that ϑ ≤ ρ (with component-wise comparison). For all such vectors ϑ, it outputs the canonical generators g ϑ ∈ G ϑ . Let e i , i = 0, . . . , κ be the i-th standard basis vector, with 1 at position i and 0 elsewhere. Define G e i as the i-th source group, G ρ as the target group, and rest of G ϑ as the intermediate groups and all the groups have same large prime order p > 2 η . As there are uncountable numbers of such vectors, it is hard to publish all. Instead, one can publish a public parameter aPPM = (κ, g e 0 , . . . , g e κ ) consisting of only source groups' canonical generators.
• (g ab
, for all a, b ∈ R Z p and it outputs an ele-
. Note that if no confusion arises, we often omit the subscripts and just write e. We can also generalize e to multiple inputs as e(h (1) , h (2) , . . . , h (ζ) ) = e(h (1) , e(h (2) , . . . , h (ζ) )). The following assumption is from ).
-It runs the algorithm aM M .Setup(1 η , 2 ρ) to generate aPPM = (κ, g e 0 , . . . , g e κ ) and e is the description of the multilinear map -It picks random t and ξ from Z p and com-
generated by the generator G κ−DHDHE µ given in Figure  1 .
Hybrid Coloring
A Hybrid Coloring of the user population, introduced by (Kiayias and Yung, 2001) , is a partition of the total number of users [N] in a broadcast encryption (BE) system. A random ciphertext C R induces a Hybrid Coloring over [N] as follows.
• Let D be a pirate decoder (PD) box. We define an equivalence relation over the user secret key space as follows:
• Assume that C m be a ciphertext corresponding to a valid message m. Then, with overwhelming high
In that case, we get a unique equivalence class. Consequently, all the users will get the same color. Let, Ciphr R be the set of all random ciphertexts such that for all C ′ ∈ Ciphr R , C ′ induces a unique equivalence class. Then, the set of all valid ciphertexts constitute a subset of Ciphr R .
• A BE scheme induces a Hybrid Coloring if there exist an algorithm that produces a ciphertext C such that C induces a partition over the user population. One important observation regarding the tracing algorithm of (Kiayias and Yung, 2001 ) is formally stated by the following lemma. Lemma 1. (Kiayias and Yung, 2001) The tracing procedure using the Hybrid Coloring has time complexity O(N 3 log 2 N) and identify a traitor with high probability.
3 OUR PLKA TRACING SCHEME Our PLKA consists of three randomized algorithms PLKA.Setup, PLKA.Enc, PLKA.Dec and an external tracing algorithm PLKA.Trace D which are described below.
• (plparams,(plsk 1 ,. . .,plsk N )) ← PLKA.Setup(η, κ): The group manager (GM) takes as input the length κ of the identities along with the security parameter η and proceeds as follows. The identity space is I D = {0, 1} κ \ {0 κ } and the total number of users the system can allow is N = (2 κ − 1).
(i) The GM first constructs ρ = (1, . . . , 1) , a (κ + 1)-length vector with all 1's, and runs the setup algorithm aM M .Setup(1 η , 2 ρ) for the multilinear map described in section 2.1 to generate the public parameter aPPM = (κ, g e 0 , . . . , g e κ ) where g e i is the canonical generator of the i-th source group G e i for 0 ≤ i ≤ κ and G 2 ρ is the target group. All the groups have the same large prime order p > 2 η . It generates the canonical generators g ρ and g 2 ρ of the groups G ρ and G 2 ρ respectively by the repeated multilinear pairing operations using aPPM.
(ii) Two GGM tree (Goldreich et al., 1986) η . It also picks PRG : {0, 1} η → {0, 1} 2η , the length doubling pseudorandom generator (Blum and Micali, 1984) .
(iii) The GM chooses ξ, τ ∈ R Z p , sets the programs PT Enc (Figure 2 ), PT Dec (Figure 3 ) and obfuscate these to generate obfuscated programs PT Enc = iO(PT Enc ), PT Dec = iO(PT Dec ) respectively using a secure indistinguishability obfuscator iO.
hard-coded in it and runs on input j,t, s to generate a header-session key pair (Hdr = (r ∈ {0, 1} 2η ,
. On the other hand, the program PT Dec (Hdr, u ∈ [N], plsk u ∈ G ρ ) has PRF rand , PRF auth , (ξ, τ), κ, g ρ , g 2 ρ hard-coded in it and runs on inputs Hdr, u, plsk u to generate the correct session key K PLKA . The obfuscated programs PT Enc and PT Dec behave in a similar manner as PT Enc and PT Dec respectively. That is, on the same input, PT Enc and PT Enc generate the same output. Similarly, PT Dec and PT Dec provide the same output on the same input. Note that in step 1(b) of PT Enc , from the GGM tree based construction PRF rand (r) is an η-bit string which is converted to an integer and added to j modulo (N + 1) to generate header component C 2 . Similarly, in step 1(a) of PT Dec , to recover j from the header component C 1 we consider the integer representation of the η-bit string PRF rand (r).
Inputs:
(a) If check fails, output ⊥ and stop (b) Otherwise, compute:
The GM finally publishes the private linear public parameter plparams= (PRF rand ,PRF auth ,PRG, PT Enc , PT Dec ).
For each user u ∈ [N], it computes the user secret key plsk u = (g ρ ) τξ u and sends plsk u to user u through a secure communication channel between the GM and the user u.
On input an integer j ∈ [N] and the public parameter plparams, the encryptor executes the following steps.
(i) It chooses elements t ∈ R Z p and s ∈ R {0, 1} η .
(ii) It generates (Hdr = (r,C 1 ,C 2 ,C 3 ,C 4 ), K PLKA ) by running the program PT Enc , extracted from plparams, on input ( j ∈ [N], t ∈ Z p , s ∈ {0, 1} η ), where Hdr = (r,C 1 ,C 2 ,C 3 ,C 4 ) is the ciphertext header and K PLKA is the session key for all the users in the set
(iii) Finally, it publishes Hdr as the ciphertext and keeps K PLKA as secret to itself. 
Algorithm 1 Traitor tracing program
τξ u to recover the session key K PLKA from the ciphertext header Hdr = (r,C 1 ,C 2 ,C 3 ,C 4 ) as follows.
(i) It runs the program PT Dec , extracted from plparams, on input (Hdr = (r,C 1 ,C 2 ,C 3 ,C 4 ), u, plsk u ).
(ii) If it passes all the checking conditions in step 2 of the program PT Dec = iO(PT Dec ) in Figure 3 , it gets the correct key K PLKA as the output; otherwise gets ⊥.
• T TTS ← PLKA.Trace D (plparams, ε): The tracer takes as input the public parameter plparams, a parameter ε which is polynomially related to the security parameter η. It runs the Trace D program of Figure 1 , on input the public parameter plparams and the parameter ε. It outputs the set of users T TTS ⊆ {1, . . . , N} as the traitor users. The proof of our tracing algorithm is given by the Theorem 2. Correctness. Let, u, j ∈[N] and 1 ≤u ≤ j≤ N. Let, (plparams,(plsk 1 ,. . .,plsk N ))←PLKA.Setup(η, κ), where plparams= (PRF rand ,PRF auth ,PRG, PT Enc , PT Dec ) and
, where Hdr = (r,C 1 ,C 2 ,C 3 ,C 4 ) with
A user u, with its secret key plsk u = (g ρ ) τξ u runs PLKA.Dec(plparams, u, plsk u , Hdr). If u passes all the conditions in step 2 of the program in Figure 3 in executing the program PT Dec in plparams, then we show below that u can recover the correct session key K PLKA = (g 2 ρ ) tξ 2 κ by extracting C 3 and C 4 from Hdr and proceeding as follows.
As, Λ 2 κ −i+u = (g ρ )
only a polynomial number of recipient sets in it, according to , the selective and the adaptive security are equivalent.
SECURITY ANALYSIS Theorem 1. (Security of Indistinguishability)
Assuming secure iO, our PLKA scheme, presented in section 3, achieves adaptive CCA-security under the κ-DHDHE assumption.
Proof. Proof. We assume that there exists an adversary A that can break the CCA-security of our PLKA scheme. We will construct an adversary B that breaks the κ-DHDHE assumption using A as a subrouter. As the recipient set in our PLKA is of the form
, only a polynomial number of recipient sets in S, the selective and adaptive security are equivalent. Therefore, we can assume that A commits to a target set before seeing the public parameter or the secret keys for the users.
− Initialization : At the beginning of the game, a polynomial sized set [ j * ] from S is selected by A and submitted to B. Here, B works as a challenger in the PLKA CCA-security game.
− Setup : The adversary B obtains the challenge in-
Here, t and ξ are random elements chosen from Z p by C DHDHE . The adversary B executes the following sequence of games to correctly generate the public parameter plparams.
The adversary B selects two random keys rand * , auth * ∈ R {0, 1} η , which are different from the keys chosen in the original protocol, for the two pseudorandom functions PRF rand * : {0, 1} 2η → {0, . . . , N} and PRF auth * : {0, 1} 2η × [N] → {0, 1} η respectively. By the security of the PRF, the output of PRF rand in the original protocol and PRF rand * as well as the outputs of PRF auth and PRF auth * , on the same inputs, are computationally indistinguishable. It also picks PRG : {0, 1} η → {0, 1} 2η , a length doubling pseudorandom generator (Blum and Micali, 1984) .
Then, B chooses a random element s * from {0, 1} η and sets the challenge ciphertext header-session key pair as (Hdr
, C * 3 = V and C * 4 = V β , and β is randomly chosen from Z p . It also computes
by implicitly setting
is computed using aPPM = (e, κ, g e 0 , . . . , g e κ ). Also, by pairing various
together, B can build all the Λ u for u ≤ 2 κ−1 = N. In
To compute Λ u for u ≥ 2 κ+1 = N + 2, set u
Note that the parameters aPPM,
thereby C * 3 and C * 4 are valid ciphertext header components and hence Hdr * = (r * ,C * 1 ,C * 2 ,C * 3 ,C * 4 ) is a valid ciphertext header for the challenge set [ j * ]. Observe that K * PLKA is a correct session key for this ciphertext header if µ = 0.
The adversary B slightly changes the above game by choosing the challenge component r * as a random value in {0, 1} 2η . This game is indistinguishable from the above game by the security of PRG. Now, with high probability, r * is not in the image of PRG.
Since, B generates the challenge ciphertext header Hdr * = (r * ,C * 1 ,C * 2 ,C * 3 ,C * 4 ) before giving A the public parameter, B can puncture the encryption program at Hdr * , meaning that if the encryption program generates a ciphertext header which is equal to the challenge ciphertext header Hdr * , then the program will set the session key as a random element of the group G 2 ρ which has exactly the same distribution as the original session key in G 2 ρ .
by repeated multilinear operations as explained in equation 2 and 3. Figure 4 . We mark the portions in PT * Enc that differ from original encryption program PT Enc (in Figure  2 ) using rectangular boxes.
Set:
To be more specific, the program PT *
hard-coded in it and runs on inputs j ∈ [N], t ∈ Z p and s ∈ {0, 1} η to generate a header-session key pair (Hdr, K PLKA ). The main difference between PT Enc and PT * Enc is that (ξ, τ) are random in PT Enc , whereas those are implicitly set in PT * Enc using {Γ} κ i=0 (extracted from κ-DHDHE instance χ µ ) and setting β as in equation 1. The program PT * Enc has a parameter A hard-coded which is computed by B by setting
.
tξ 2 κ . Consequently, K PLKA has the same distribution over G 2 ρ in both PT * Enc ( Figure 4 ) and PT Enc (Figure 2) . Also, the ciphertext component C 4 in step 1.(d) of PT * Enc (Figure 4 ) has the same distribution as that in PT Enc (Figure 2 ), as
Note that τ is implicitly sets as in equation 1 and β is random, thereby τ is random.
Observe that both the programs PT Enc in Figure  2 and PT * Enc in Figure 4 have size at most polylogarithmic in the total number of users and the security parameter of the system, i.e., poly(log N, η). Also, B has punctured the program PT * Enc at the challenge ciphertext header Hdr * = (r * ,C * 1 ,C * 2 ,C * 3 ,C * 4 ) in step 2. Thus, outputs of PT Enc and PT * Enc differ only when
Enc , where W is randomly chosen from G 2 ρ . However, Hdr = Hdr * with overwhelming high probability by the security of PRG. Hence, by the indistinguishability property of iO, PT * Enc = iO(PT * Enc ) and PT Enc = iO(PT Enc ) are computationally indistinguishable.
This game is identical to the previous game except the manner in which the decryption program is constructed. The adversary B's goal is to puncture the decryption program at the point Hdr * = (r * ,C * 1 ,C * 2 ,C * 3 ,C * 4 ) and the naive way to accomplish this is to set random elements of G ρ as a secret key for all user u ≤ j * and hard-code (PRF auth (r,C 1 ) ).
(c) If u < m output ⊥ and stop .
, where Λ u and
by repeated multilinear pairing operations.
Check that
(a) If check fails, output ⊥ and stop.
(b) Otherwise, compute: Then B can replace each plsk u for u ≤ j * , embedded in the decryption program, with a truly random element of G ρ , and with high probability none of these will be equal to the original plsk u , belongs to G ρ . This will allow B to add a check that u > j * at the beginning of the decryption program (as in step 1.(c) in Figure 5 , where m = 1, . . . , j * + 1) and stop the program if the check fails. This does not change the functionality of the program. Since in Figure 5 , the program checks that j * < u ≤ j and aborts if not and on the challenge ciphertext header. On the challenge ciphertext header, where j = j * , it either fails to satisfy step 1.(c) or step 2. So that the program will never as in Figure 5 and 6, where the program PT * (m+ 1 2 )·Dec includes a single hard-coded value R m , randomly chosen from G ρ , used in step 1.(c). Each of these program is at most poly(log N, η) in size, as of the original decryption program PT Dec in Figure 3 and the original program PT Dec is functionally equivalent to PT *
(1)·Dec as
The program PT * (m+ 1 2 )·Dec (in Figure 6 ) can be punctured at the point u = m by adding a truly random element R m of G ρ and with overwhelmingly high probability, this R m is not equal to any user's secret key. Then indistinguishability of obfuscation allows moving from PT * 
Note that y has exactly the same distribution in both PT Dec and PT (PRF auth (r,C 1 ) ).
else,
where Λ u and for 1 ≤ i ≤ j * , Λ 2 κ −i+u computed using {Γ i } κ i=0 by repeated multilinear pairing operations.
(b) Otherwise, compute: program PT * (j * +1)·Dec outputs ⊥ on encryption to the set [ j * ], since it checks u ≥ j * + 1 at step 1.(c) and also check u ≤ j * at step 2. Therefore, since B generates the challenge ciphertext header 
PLKA failure otherwise − Consider that user j ∈ [N] is not a traitor user. Then, the secret key plsk j of user j is not embedded into the pirate decoder box D. Note that if plsk k is embedded into D for some k < j, then H j = H k = success and consequently |p j − p k | = 0. On the other hand, if j ∈ [N] is the least positive integer such that 
CONCLUSION
In this work, coupling iO with the PRF of (Goldreich et al., 1986) under the prime order multilinear group setting, we have designed a adaptively CCA-secure PLKA traitor tracing whose security relied on the hardness of standard DHDHE-assumption. Adopting the prime order multilinear group setting, we have constructed the first full collusion resistance and publicly traceable tracing algorithm with shorter run time. As pointed out by (Garg et al., 2010) , the communication, storage and computational efficiency of prime order group setting are much higher compared to that of composite order with an equivalent level of security. More precisely, our design significantly reduces the ciphertext size, public parameter size and user secret key size, which is so far a plausible improvement in the literature. Consequently, our PLKA traitor tracing is highly cost-effective and efficient compared to existing private linear traitor tracing schemes in the literature.
